Slowly, we are Growing together – European Economic Policy and Statistics by Aurel Schubert & Luis Serna
ANALYSES
4
Slowly, we are growing together 
– European Economic Policy 
and Statistics1
Aurel Schubert2  | European Central Bank, Frankfurt am Main, Germany
Luis M. Serna3  | European Central Bank, Frankfurt am Main, Germany
1     Th   is paper refl  ects the personal views of the authors and not necessarily those of the ECB or the ESCB. An earlier version 
of it was presented at the Statistische Woche 2012 in Vienna, Austria, on 21 September 2012.
2   Directorate General Statistics, European Central Bank, Kaiserstrasse 29, 60311 Frankfurt am Main, Germany. 
E-mail: aurel.schubert@ecb.int.
3   Directorate General Statistics, European Central Bank, Kaiserstrasse 29, 60311 Frankfurt am Main, Germany. 
E-mail: luis.serna@ecb.int.
Abstract
In the last 20 years statistical data has become vastly more important for economic policy in Europe. Where-
as economic statistics once played a role in relatively marginal areas of European policy, the establishment 
of the macroeconomic convergence criteria for joining Economic and Monetary Union in the Maastricht 
Treaty in 1992–1993 sparked a quantum leap. Questions of comparability and harmonisation suddenly be-
came increasingly relevant. Th   e Stability and Growth Pact then made the calculation of the budget defi  cit and 
government debt even more important, including the measurement of GDP as denominator for the respective 
ratios. With the outbreak of the second Greek crisis in 2009–10 and the fl  aws that emerged in the quality of 
Greek economic statistics, statistical questions were suddenly at the centre of international media and political 
interest. At the same time the fi  nancial and economic crisis brought to the fore severe economic imbalances, 
both between European countries and within European countries. In order to prevent similar imbalances 
in the future, the EU has developed and adopted the "macroeconomic imbalance procedure", in which cur-
rently eleven macroeconomic indicators are used for on-going surveillance of countries ("alert mechanism"). 
Th   us more economic statistics have gained an important political function, particularly since sanctions can 
even be imposed on the basis of them. In parallel with this, the new European Supervisory Authorities use 
"dashboards" i.e. a range of statistics that are regularly watched and are intended to function as early warning 
indicators. Th   e paper takes a look at this move towards more "evidence-based policy making" and its implica-
tions for European statistics and statisticians and discusses the related challenges, paying particular attention 
to the role of the European Central Bank and its specifi  c data needs.
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INTRODUCTION
Th   e role and importance of statistics have varied over time in the European Union’s analyses, decisions 
and communication. Over the years, the removal of barriers to trade between Member States in order 
to turn the “common market” into a genuine single market in which goods, services, people and capital 
can move freely has required countless policy decisions not always based on fi  rm statistical information.
Th   e ever growing need for intensifi  ed coordination of economic policies of Member States and vari-
ous Community policies, such as EU regional policies, has gradually led to a parallel increase in the role 
played by statistics, in a process that can be described as “evidence-based” policy-making. Th   is has been 
good news for statisticians, who have received increased attention from policy-makers and higher pub-
lic recognition for their work. 
Parallel to that, some of the vast array of economic and fi  nancial statistics and indicators available 
received particular attention when they were used for European administrative purposes. Th   is was the 
case of the measurement of EU Member States’ gross national income at market prices, which has been 
used in the calculation of the Member States’ contributions to the funding of the European Union. Since 
1989, European Council legal acts4 have prescribed that this indicator is to be compiled in application of 
the European system of national accounts in force (ESA) and provided further details for its compilation.
Th   is example illustrates that in the European context, the simple selection of a statistical indicator for 
policy or administrative use entails that its comparability and reliability must be reinforced beyond the 
applicable internationally agreed statistical standards, such as the System of National Accounts (SNA).
For most countries in the world, the SNA is only a methodological manual to which they voluntarily 
adhere. In Europe, its equivalent, the European System of Accounts, is a legal act.
1  THE 1992 TREATY OF MAASTRICHT: A QUANTUM LEAP FOR STATISTICS IN THE EUROPEAN
    UNION
Th   e challenges associated with the growing tendency of using statistics for EU economic policies ex-
perienced a quantum leap more than 20 years ago with the adoption of the Treaty on European Union 
signed in Maastricht in February 1992. Th   ree particular elements of this Treaty conferred to statistics a 
prominent role in the preparatory work for the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) and the launch 
of the euro as a single currency:
Th  e  fi  rst element was the creation of the European Monetary Institute (EMI) and then the European 
Central Bank, which was entrusted, among other things, with the task of conducting the monetary policy 
for the single currency, the euro. Furthermore, the Treaty gave powers to the ECB, assisted by the na-
tional central banks, to collect the necessary information to support the conduct of its monetary policy, 
and assigned other tasks to the European System of Central Banks (ESCB), including those related to 
fi  nancial stability.
Th   e second element was the specifi  cation of economic convergence criteria for euro adoption, which 
were based on a set of statistical indicators comprising the Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices (HICP), 
government defi  cit and debt, the exchange rate, long-term interest rates and an array of other statistical 
data to further assess the sustainability of the convergence achieved.
A third element related to the need to maintain and enforce fi  scal discipline within EMU aft  er entry, 
which led to the adoption in 1997 of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) further specifying the needs to 
adhere to quantitative ceilings for government defi  cits and debt as a percentage of GDP, with the threat 
of sanctions in case of breaches.
4     See Council Directive 89/130/EEC, Euratom of 13 February 1989 on the harmonization of the compilation of gross na-
tional product at market prices and Council Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 1287/2003 of 15 July 2003 on the harmonisa-
tion of gross national income at market prices.ANALYSES
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As a result of these three elements embedded in the Maastricht Treaty, quality-related issues such as 
the availability, comparability and harmonisation of statistics have become increasingly relevant.
2 THE ROLE OF STATISTICS IN THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND MONETARY UNION
Th   e Treaty on European Union specifi  ed as one of the tasks of the European Monetary Institute (EMI), 
the forerunner of the ECB, the preparation of statistics for Stage Th   ree of EMU and, specifi  cally, the pro-
motion of the harmonisation of statistics to the extent necessary. Th   e EMI fi  rst released a comprehensive 
statement of statistical requirements in July 1996.5
Moreover, in October 1998, the ECB defi  ned price stability as “a year-on-year increase in the Har-
monised Index of Consumer Prices (HICP) for the euro area of below 2%” and added that price stability 
was “to be maintained over the medium term”.6 Furthermore, the ECB announced its monetary policy 
strategy based on a comprehensive analysis of the threats to price stability, comprising an “economic 
analysis” and a “monetary analysis”.7 Th   e “economic analysis” focuses on real economic activity and fi  -
nancial conditions in the economy and is aimed at assessing the short to medium-term determinants 
of price developments. Th   e economic and fi  nancial statistics supporting the analysis include prices and 
costs statistics, main aggregates of national accounts, government fi  nance statistics, short-term business 
and labour indicators, exchange rates, the balance of payments of the euro area, fi  nancial market statis-
tics and the fi  nancial balance sheets of euro area sectors.
Th   e “monetary analysis” focuses on money and liquidity and serves to cross-check, from a medium to 
long-term perspective, the indications resulting from the “economic analysis”. To signal its commitment 
to monetary analysis, the ECB sets at 4.5% the reference value for the annual growth rate of the broad 
monetary aggregate M3. Th   is reference value is not a monetary target, but a benchmark for analysis of the 
information content. Th   e statistics supporting this analysis include, for example, the detailed consolidated 
balance sheets of euro area banks, in particular the monetary aggregates and counterparts, interest rates 
on banks’ retail loans and deposits, the balance sheets of other monetary and fi  nancial institutions, such as 
investment funds, securities issues statistics and the fi  nancial balance sheets of the non-fi  nancial sectors.
Th   e need to monitor and cross-check all the relevant statistical information that could infl  uence price 
stability under the ECB’s two-pillar approach resulted in a high demand for harmonised euro area sta-
tistics, which were scarce at that time.
2.1  The division of statistical responsibilities between the ECB and Eurostat
Th   e Maastricht Treaty assigned the responsibility for providing offi   cial economic and fi  nancial statistics 
to both the ECB, assisted by the national central banks, and the European Commission, which in practice 
means Eurostat. Th   e division of statistical responsibilities to avoid double work and gaps was established 
in a memorandum of understanding (MoU) signed in 1995 and amended in 2003.8
Under the MoU, the ECB is responsible for monetary and fi  nancial statistics. Responsibility for external 
statistics (balance of payments and international investment position) and for the euro area accounts is 
shared. Eurostat is responsible for general economic statistics. Th   e latter include the Harmonised Index 
of Consumer Prices (HICP), which was chosen by the ECB as its benchmark for price stability.
At the starting point of the preparation process there were signifi  cant gaps and weaknesses. Where 
national statistics were available, the underlying concepts, defi  nitions and classifi  cations lacked stan-
dardisation.
5     Implementation Package (Statistical Requirements for Stage Th   ree of Monetary Union), EMI, July 1996.
6   Th   e ECB’s Governing Council confi  rmed this defi  nition in May 2003 and clarifi  ed that “in the pursuit of price stability, 
it aims to maintain infl  ation rates below but close to 2% over the medium term”.
7   See Chapter 3.5 of  Th   e monetary policy of the ECB, ECB, May 2011.
8   See  <http://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/other/mouecbeurostaten.pdf>.2014
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Describing in detail the extraordinary and cooperative eff  ort made over the years by the European 
System of Central Banks (ESCB) on one side and Eurostat and the national statistical institutes (NSIs) 
on the other, is clearly out of the scope of this paper. Moreover, the importance of statistics for monetary 
policy is described in what follows from the ECB and ESCB viewpoint, which does not mean that the 
work undertaken by Eurostat and the NSIs in macro-economic statistics has not been equally impres-
sive and important.
   
2.2 Areas of statistics either under ECB sole responsibility or shared responsibility with Eurostat
Th   e ECB compiled statistics for the euro area using data supplied by the National Central Banks (NCBs) 
of the euro area, which in turn received the data from reporting agents, and in some limited cases, from 
the National Statistical Institutes.
By the time the euro was launched in 1999 the initial set of statistics available for the euro area com-
prised only the bare essentials: harmonised balance sheets of monetary and fi  nancial institutions to en-
able calculation of monetary aggregates and counterparts to money, a limited amount of data on non-
harmonised retail interest rates, fi  nancial market information acquired from commercial data providers, 
and key balance of payments statistics. Additionally, annual government fi  nance statistics and some 
limited annual data on saving, investment and fi  nancing were available.
Later in 1999, statistics on securities issues by euro area governments and fi  nancial and non-fi  nancial 
corporations were produced. In the subsequent years work continued in this area9, based on the prioritised 
user needs. More detailed breakdowns of instruments, maturities and counterpart sectors of Monetary 
and Financial Institutions’ (MFIs) balance sheet statistics were added in 2003. At the same time, har-
monised MFI interest rates statistics were introduced, covering a breakdown of both retail deposits and 
retail loans by maturity and purpose. Th   e ECB took over the release of the daily yield curves for euro area 
central government bonds from Eurostat. Continuing work in this area, investment fund statistics were 
released in December 2009, and new harmonised statistics on Financial Vehicle Corporations engaged 
in securitisation and bank securitisation were published as of June 2011. At the same time, not yet fully 
harmonised statistics on Insurance Corporations and Pension Funds were published as of June 2011 and 
work towards their total harmonisation to better serve user needs is on-going. As a result, a large part of 
the so-called “shadow banking” sector is statistically well covered in the euro area.
Concerning external statistics, the ECB has gradually enhanced the initial set of balance of payments 
data (b.o.p.) for the euro area by providing more breakdowns, by showing debits and credits separately 
and by off  ering a geographical breakdown of major counterparts (e.g. the United States, the United King-
dom, EU countries outside the euro area, Japan and China). Th   e ECB now also produces and publishes 
a quarterly international investment position (i.i.p.) as well as a breakdown of the changes in the i.i.p. 
for the euro area.
Moreover, statistics on the nominal and real eff  ective exchange rate and on the international role of 
the euro have been made available, and have subsequently been supplemented by monthly harmonised 
national competitiveness indicators based on consumer price indices.
Th   e wide range of statistics available to the ECB to help it fulfi  l its duties was integrated in June 2007 
into quarterly euro area economic and fi  nancial accounts by institutional sector. Th   ese accounts, com-
piled together with Eurostat, provide a comprehensive and coherent overview of euro area fi  nancial and 
economic developments. Th   ey also show the interrelations between the diff  erent sectors in the euro area 
(households, corporations and general government) and between them and the rest of the world. Th  e 
full integration and almost complete consistency of these accounts as well as their joint, simultaneous 
compilation every quarter by two institutions (the ECB and Eurostat) was a major achievement.
9     See BULL, P. Th   e development of statistics for economic and monetary union. ECB, June 2004.ANALYSES
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Furthermore, many statistics and statistical indicators have also been compiled to assess fi  nancial 
market developments, fi  nancial integration in Europe, fi  nancial stability overall and within the EU bank-
ing sector, and the development of payments, payment infrastructures and securities trading, clearing 
and settlement.
2.3 Areas of statistics under Eurostat’s sole responsibility
By the start of Economic and Monetary Union, Eurostat, in collaboration with the national statistical 
institutes, had developed the HICP as a harmonised price index as well as other statistics on prices, 
costs, labour markets and other economic developments. Limited national accounts data for the euro 
area were available. However, the timeliness of these statistics was not satisfactory for monetary policy 
purposes. Over time, the timeliness of the relevant euro area statistics provided by Eurostat has im-
proved signifi  cantly, following in particular the adoption of the Action Plan for EMU Statistics (2000) 
by the ECOFIN Council and the establishment of a list of monthly and quarterly Principal European 
Economic Indicators (PEEIs) in 2002. As an example, timely fl  ash estimates for the HICP and for the 
quarterly GDP volume changes were important achievements and these data feed into the monetary policy 
and economic analyses. In addition, the range of available government fi  nance statistics, both annual 
and quarterly, has signifi  cantly expanded. Methodological standards have been further improved in all 
areas.
However, as described in the 2013 Economic and Financial Committee Status Report on Information 
Requirements in EMU, further work is still required in terms of new statistics and the frequency and/or 
quality of statistics available. Improvements are still being made, mainly in the area of services, labour 
markets (integrating labour market statistics into the national accounts to serve growth and productiv-
ity analyses) and housing markets. Further timeliness and other quality improvements are also needed 
for some other statistics.
2.4 The essential role of cooperation between the ESCB and the ESS
Th   e impressive eff  ort devoted to developing new statistics and to gradually improving them over the years 
has benefi  ted from close cooperation between the European System of Central Banks (ESCB) on one 
side and Eurostat and the national statistical institutes on the other (i.e. the European Statistical Sys-
tem (ESS)), notably in the context of the Committee on Monetary, Financial and Balance of Payments 
Statistics (CMFB). For more than two decades10 the CMFB has been an important forum for mutual 
exchange of statistical expertise and has contributed to enhance the collection, compilation and access 
to high-quality EU and euro area economic and fi  nancial statistics. Moreover, the advisory role of the 
CMFB has been of key importance in the context of the statistics used for the application of the Exces-
sive Defi  cit Procedure (EDP).
2.5 Fulfi  lling ECB data needs: a constant challenge for ESCB and ESS statisticians 
As a result of the continued eff  ort briefl  y described in this paper, European statistics produced by both 
the ESCB and the ESS have improved remarkably over the years and have enabled the ECB to fulfi  l its 
prime responsibility of conducting the monetary policy of the euro area and the various tasks entrusted 
to it in the Treaty.
Ensuring over time that such an array of statistics are of  high quality and  up-to-date has been a con-
stant challenge that ESCB and ESS statisticians have successfully addressed amid continuous fi  nancial 
10   To celebrate its 20th anniversary, the Committee on Monetary, Financial and Balance of Payments statistics published 
 the book, Promoting excellence in European statistics. CMFB 20 years, <http://www.cmfb.org/pdf/2011-11-25%20
 CMFB_Promoting%20Excellence%20in%20European%20Statistics.pdf>.2014
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innovation, euro area and EU enlargements, the challenges posed by globalisation and the increasing 
demand for statistics for the purposes of resolving the current fi  nancial and economic crisis.
3 DATA DEMANDS BEYOND AGGREGATES AND AVERAGES
European policy-makers’ demands to close obvious data gaps evidenced by the crisis have increased 
exponentially. At the same time, they have come to demand more detailed data beyond the traditional 
aggregate approach to statistics, requesting information on distributions around the averages, and, in 
addition to the euro area aggregates, also country level information. Especially, the early identifi  cation 
of economic vulnerabilities within Europe or the euro area required such detailed information.
Th   us, in areas in which no comparable and timely data existed, such as the fi  nancial conditions faced 
by small and medium enterprises (SMEs), the ECB had to go beyond the traditional census type statis-
tics and develop, in collaboration with the European Commission, a survey on the access to fi  nance of 
SMEs in the European Union. Since mid-2009 this survey has been conducted every two years, while the 
ECB runs part of the survey every six months for companies in the euro area in order to assess the latest 
developments in their fi  nancing conditions.
In addition, the ECB has implemented, together with 15 Eurosystem NCBs and in close cooperation 
with a number of national statistical institutes, a survey of household fi  nance and consumption in the 
euro area whose fi  rst results have  been published in April 2013. Th   e survey provides micro-level data 
on households’ real and fi  nancial assets, liabilities, consumption and saving, income and employment, 
future pension entitlements, intergenerational transfers and gift  s, and attitudes to risk.
Both surveys are vivid examples of how statisticians have responded to the changing information 
needs of European policy makers.
4  THE IMPORTANT ROLE OF STATISTICS IN CONFRONTING THE FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC
     CRISIS
One of the key lessons from the crisis has been that policy-makers need more and more timely quan-
titative information in order to take good decisions or make recommendations. For the ECB, this has 
translated into an additional high demand for statistics in the areas of fi  nancial stability and macro-
prudential supervision, areas in which it has to lend support to the recently created European Systemic 
Risk Board (ESRB).11
Th  e  fi  nancial crisis which started in 2007 revealed some weaknesses in the governance of the European 
Economic and Monetary Union, particularly in the fi  eld of EU macro- and micro-fi  nancial supervision. 
Moreover, weaknesses were also detected in the governance of the euro area and the EU in relation to 
the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) and surveillance of euro area countries’ macroeconomic imbal-
ances.
All these weaknesses have in the meantime been addressed by legislative measures which represent 
the most comprehensive reinforcement of the EU architecture since the launch of the EMU project 20 years 
ago. Th   eir implementation entails a major step forward for statistics as selected sets of warning indicators 
(dashboards, scoreboards) play an increasingly important policy role and may trigger recommendations, 
warnings and in some cases fi  nes. Naturally, besides the implied additional demand for statistics, we can 
expect an increased public interest in such indicators, also at international level.12
11   Th   e ECB shall ensure a Secretariat, and thereby provide analytical, statistical, logistical and administrative support to the 
ESRB (Article 2 of Council Regulation (EU) No 1096/2010).
12  Th   e 12 December 2012 US Federal Reserve policy statement announcing that it will be appropriate to maintain its excep-
tionally low range for the federal funds rate “at least as long as the unemployment rate remains above 6.5%” is an example 
of how an indicator may receive increased international attention when it is selected as policy target. ANALYSES
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4.1  ESRB Dashboard of indicators for macro-prudential oversight of the fi  nancial system
Th  e  fi  nancial crisis revealed important shortcomings in EU fi  nancial supervision, which had failed to 
anticipate adverse macro-prudential developments and to prevent the accumulation of excessive and 
systemic risks within the fi  nancial system. A proper functioning of EU and global fi  nancial systems and 
the mitigation of threats to them required enhanced consistency between macro and micro-prudential 
supervision.
To remedy the situation and prevent a future crisis, the EU decided to bring together the actors of fi  -
nancial supervision at national level and at the level of the EU to act as a network.  Th   e European System 
of Financial Supervision (ESFS), which started its work on 1 January 2011, comprises the European Sys-
temic Risk Board (ESRB), which is in charge of macro-prudential oversight, and three micro-prudential 
supervisory authorities: the European Banking Authority, the European Insurance and Occupational 
Pensions Authority and the European Securities and Markets Authority.
In its responsibility for macro-prudential oversight across the entire EU fi  nancial system, the ESRB is 
charged with identifying risks to fi  nancial stability and, where necessary, with issuing risk warnings and 
recommendations for action to address such risks. 
Th   e ECB plays a prominent role as, in accordance with the legislation, it provides “analytical, statisti-
cal, administrative and logistical support to the ESRB, also drawing on technical advice from national 
central banks and supervisors”.
In its duty to support the ESRB in the area of statistics, the ECB helps to ensure that appropriate and 
reliable information is made available for the ESRB to perform its duties, while preserving the confi  den-
tiality of that information as is legally required.
In accordance with the ESRB Regulation, the ECB has developed, together with the ESRB Secretariat, 
a Risk Dashboard comprising about 45 relevant indicators to identify and assess potential systemic risks. 
Th   ose systemic risks include risks of disruption to fi  nancial services caused by a signifi  cant impairment 
of all or parts of the EU fi  nancial system that could potentially have serious negative consequences for 
the internal market and the real economy. Any type of fi  nancial institution and intermediary, market, 
infrastructure and instrument has the potential to be systemically signifi  cant.
Th   e ESRB Risk Dashboard, which was published on 20 September 2012 for the fi  rst time, is divided 
into six categories: inter-linkages and composite measures of systemic risk, macro risk, credit risk, fund-
ing and liquidity, market risk and profi  tability and solvency. Th   e data sources are the ECB, Eurostat and 
commercial data providers.
In addition to developing the indicators, both in terms of choosing the right type of indicator and 
structuring the Dashboard eff  ectively, the work of statisticians includes assessing the quality of each in-
dicator chosen, partly through back-testing. Annual updates of the list of indicators will ensure that the 
Dashboard remains a relevant tool for identifying and measuring systemic risk.13
4.2  Fiscal surveillance in the amended Stability and Growth Pact
Th   e economic and fi  nancial crisis has exacerbated the pressure on the public fi  nances of EU Member 
States. Government fi  nance statistics, which are a key element in supporting fi  scal surveillance under the 
Stability and Growth Pact, received renewed attention when the fi  scal imbalances of several European 
countries led to increases in their sovereign risks.
Under the reinforced SGP adopted in December 2011, fi  nancial sanctions apply to euro area Mem-
ber States that do not take adequate action to bring their budget defi  cits below 3% of GDP within the 
agreed timeframe. Th  e  fi  nancial sanctions are imposed unless a “reverse qualifi  ed majority” of Mem-
13  Th   e three European Supervisory Authorities have also developed their respective dashboards, although they have been 
not (yet) published.2014
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ber States vote against it, which makes the enforcement of the rules more automatic, dissuasive and 
credible.
Moreover, under the amended SGP the debt criterion of the Treaty, which established a general gov-
ernment debt benchmark, namely a 60% debt-to-GDP ratio, has received more emphasis and must be 
respected aft  er a transitional period. Aft  er taking into account all the relevant factors and the impact of 
the economic cycle, if the gap between its debt level and the 60% reference is not reduced by 1/20th an-
nually (on average over three years), the Member State concerned will be subject to the excessive defi  cit 
procedure, even if its defi  cit is below 3%.
Th   e above-mentioned corrective measures are further complemented by preventive measures based 
on country-specifi  c medium-term objectives, compliance with which will be closely monitored based 
on statistics, with the possibility of imposing fi  nancial sanctions in the form of non-interest-bearing 
deposits and fi  nes.
In this context, ensuring that the data used for EU fi  scal surveillance meets the necessary statisti-
cal quality standards is of utmost importance. Th   e Commission (Eurostat) was given this responsibil-
ity within the framework of the Excessive Defi  cit Procedure (EDP) at the time of its implementation in 
1994. However, Eurostat does not compile directly government data for the Member States but depends 
greatly on the data compiled and reported by them, as well as on the administrative ability, goodwill 
and cooperation of the respective national statistical authorities. On specifi  c occasions, this framework 
has resulted in data misreporting, which has led to a number of measures being taken over the years to 
strengthen the EU governance of fi  scal statistics. Among them, Council Regulation (EU) No 679/2010 
has granted Eurostat new competences for regularly monitoring and verifying public fi  nance data, which 
it will exercise by conducting more in-depth dialogue visits to Member States and by extending such 
visits to public entities supplying upstream public fi  nance data to the NSIs.14
Th   e traditional role of the ECB in monitoring government fi  nance statistics, e.g. via its participation 
in the CMFB, has even increased with the ECB role in country missions (Troika), the ECB’s bond pur-
chases under the Securities Markets Program and possible Outright Monetary Transactions. Access to 
detailed, timely and higher government fi  nance data is absolutely crucial for the ECB.15
4.3  Scoreboard of indicators for macroeconomic imbalances surveillance
Similarly to fi  scal surveillance, the new mechanism for identifying and correcting competitiveness gaps 
and major macroeconomic imbalances relies heavily on statistical information.
Th   e Macroeconomic Imbalances Procedure (MIP) is a new surveillance and enforcement mechanism 
based on Article 121.6 of the Treaty on the functioning of the European Union and relies on the follow-
ing main elements:
  preventive and corrective action: before the imbalances become large this procedure allows the 
Commission and the Council to adopt preventive recommendations at an early stage. In more se-
rious cases, there is also a corrective limb, under which an excessive imbalance procedure can be 
opened for a Member State; 
  rigorous enforcement consisting of a two-step approach whereby an interest-bearing deposit can 
be imposed aft  er one failure to comply with the recommended corrective action. Aft  er a second 
compliance failure, this interest-bearing deposit can be converted into a fi  ne (up to 0.1% of GDP). 
14  Section 5 elaborates further on the importance of following sound quality principles for developing, producing and dis-
seminating statistics in an independent manner and free from any political pressure.   
15  Th   is essential role of government fi  nance statistics for the ECB is the rationale for having a dedicated ESCB working group 
for government fi  nance statistics (WG GFS).ANALYSES
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Th   e semi-automatic decision-making process uses reverse qualifi  ed majority voting to decide on 
sanctions, making it very diffi   cult for Member States to form a blocking majority; and
  an early warning system: an alert system is established based on an economic reading of a score-
board consisting of a set of statistical indicators covering the major sources of macroeconomic 
imbalances. Th   e scoreboard contains thresholds for the indicators which trigger further in-depth 
analyses to determine the gravity of potential imbalances, with the help of a broader set of indicators.
Th   e early involvement of statisticians from both the ESS and the E(S)CB in the discussions concern-
ing the statistical aspects has ensured that the ten indicators of the scoreboard launched on 14 February 
2012 are relevant, simple, measurable, available in good time and based on a solid statistical method-
ological framework. Moreover, this work is being completed by the development of quality profi  les for 
the indicators.
Th   e composition of the scoreboard indicators may evolve over time to ensure that it remains relevant. 
To this end, the revised MIP scoreboard released on 28 November 2012 incorporated an additional in-
dicator related to the fi  nancial sector, namely the total liabilities of the fi  nancial sector (see Annex 1). 
Acknowledging the importance of timely statistics of the highest quality for the credibility of the MIP 
procedure, the ECOFIN, in its conclusions of 8 November 2011 and 13 November 2012, invited the 
ESS and the ESCB “to work together on improving the underlying statistics and to ensure compara-
bility”.16
5  QUALITY ISSUES AND THE GREEK CASE
With the increased use of statistics by European policy-makers, the quality of European offi   cial statistics 
has become a very important issue.
In a democratic society, offi   cial statistics are one of the cornerstones of good government and public 
confi  dence in good government. It is therefore fundamental to ensure the highest possible quality stan-
dards in the compilation and dissemination of statistics.
In the early 1990s, the public’s trust in offi   cial statistics in various countries, particularly in Central 
Europe and the former Soviet Union, was impaired. To remedy the situation, the Conference of European 
Statisticians adopted the Fundamental Principles of Offi   cial Statistics (1992), which were subsequently 
endorsed by the United Nations Statistical Commission (1994).17
As Principle one states: “Offi   cial statistics provide an indispensable element in the information system 
of a democratic society, serving the government, the economy and the public with data about the economic, 
demographic, social and environmental situation. To this end, offi   cial statistics that meet the test of practical 
utility are to be compiled and made available on an impartial basis by offi   cial statistical agencies to honour 
citizens’ entitlement to public information.”
5.1  Quality Framework in the European Statistical System (ESS)
Enhanced surveillance of fi  scal, macroeconomic and macro-prudential policies must rely on statistical 
information produced under robust quality management. At the same time, the quality of the data is key 
for any credible policy process.
During the economic and fi  nancial crisis the insuffi   cient quality of fi  scal data provided to Eurostat by 
Member States jeopardised the credibility of the entire fi  scal surveillance framework of the EDP once more.
16  Refer to the draft   Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the provision and quality of statistics for 
the macroeconomic imbalances procedure <http://www.ipex.eu/IPEXL-WEB/dossier/fi  les/download/082dbcc53eea9c0
3013f1dcf7c0816e7.do> and the ECB opinion on it <http://www.ecb.europa.eu/ecb/legal/pdf/en_con_2013_72_f_sign.
pdf>.
17  See <http://unstats.un.org/unsd/dnss/gp/fundprinciples.aspx>.2014
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Th   e triggering element was a new “Greek case”, i.e. the renewed problems in the Greek fi  scal statis-
tics,18 which pointed out that the measures taken aft  er the 2004 Greek misreporting of the Excessive 
Defi  cit Procedure data required further reinforcement. Th   e governance of the European Statistical Sys-
tem (ESS) had been improved, in particular with the adoption of the Code of Practice in 2005, but its 
implementation and monitoring relied to a large extent on a self-regulatory approach (self-assessments, 
peer reviews and national implementation plans). In 2009, the situation changed when a newly created 
body, the European Statistical Governance Advisory Board (ESGAB),19 started work in order to provide 
an independent overview of the implementation of the Code by Eurostat and the NSIs and the Regula-
tion on European Statistics entered into force.
In its fi  rst report of November 2009, the ESGAB included some general recommendations regarding 
the institutional set-up in reaction to the fi  rst information about the new Greek case: “An appropriate 
institutional framework is crucial in order to safeguard the professional independence of statistical au-
thorities. Suspicions of interventions aff  ecting the data produced need to be further investigated. More-
over, the procedures for the appointment and dismissal of Heads of National Statistical Institutes (NSIs) 
should be transparent and kept separate from political mandates.” Th   e report also stresses that “a stronger 
commitment from top management in the statistical offi   ces and a stronger adherence to common quality 
standards at the level of the ESS will be of essence”.
Subsequently, the fi  nancial crisis evolved into a fi  scal crisis in Europe which required further mea-
sures to address the remaining weaknesses in the governance framework of the ESS, including granting 
Eurostat new competences on EDP matters. Th   ese weaknesses were described in the Communication 
from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council of 15 April 2011 entitled “Towards 
robust quality management for European Statistics”.20
In this context, the Code of Practice was revised in September 2011 in order to distinguish between 
the principles to be implemented by ESS members and the principles relating to the institutional envi-
ronment that are to be implemented by Member State governments.
Moreover, the Regulation on European Statistics21 is currently under revision with a view to clarify-
ing, among other things, that the principle of professional independence of NSIs applies unconditionally. 
Statistics must indeed be developed, produced and disseminated in an independent manner, free of any 
pressure from political or interest groups or from EU or national authorities, and existing institutional 
frameworks must not be allowed to restrict this principle.
5.2  Quality Framework in the European System of Central Banks (ESCB)
Credibility has always been crucial for central banks, and therefore, for the statistics they produce.
Since the establishment of the ECB, adherence to high-quality standards has been considered a key 
determinant in maintaining the public’s confi  dence in the ECB statistics upon which policy decisions are 
based. Currently, this is also of upmost importance in view of the ECB’s provision of statistical support 
to the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB). 
Th   e ECB statistics follow widely agreed global and European statistical standards such as the System 
of National Accounts, the European System of Accounts and the Balance of Payments Manual. Moreover, 
the ECB actively cooperates with the relevant international organisations (Eurostat, IMF, BIS, OECD, UN) 
to achieve worldwide harmonisation of standards and defi  nitions for economic and fi  nancial statistics.
18  See the Report on Greek government defi  cit and debt statistics. European Commission, January 2010.   
19  See ESGAB’s website <http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/esgab/introduction>.
20  See <http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/quality/documents/COM-2011-211_Communication_Qual-
ity_Management_EN.pdf>.
21  See <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2009:087:0164:0173:en:PDF>.ANALYSES
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In a clear commitment to high-quality statistical work, the ECB and the NCBs also follow interna-
tionally agreed quality standards, such as those formulated in the IMF’s Special Data Dissemination 
Standard and Data Quality Assessment Framework, which are in turn rooted in the UN Fundamental 
Principles of Offi   cial Statistics.
Even though the Treaty provisions concerning the ESCB’s independence and accountability also apply 
to its statistical function, the ESCB collaborates with the European Statistical System (ESS) and respects 
and applies rigorously the principles laid down in the European Statistics Code of Practice for the Na-
tional and Community Statistical Authorities.22
Th   us, the statistical principles underlying the European statistics produced by the ESCB are currently 
set out in Article 3a of Council Regulation 2533/98 as amended in 2009: “Th   e development, production 
and dissemination of European statistics by the ESCB shall be governed by the principles of impartial-
ity, objectivity, professional independence, cost eff  ectiveness, statistical confi  dentiality, minimisation of 
the reporting burden and high output quality, including reliability and the defi  nitions of these principles 
shall be adopted, elaborated on and published by the ECB. Th   ese principles are similar to the statistical 
principles of Regulation (EC) No 223/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 
2009 on European statistics.”
All these elements are covered by the recently amended “Public commitment on European statistics 
by the ESCB”, which stresses adherence to high-quality standards when collecting, compiling and dis-
seminating statistics under the ESCB’s responsibility.23
6  COMMUNICATION ASPECTS
Policy-makers should communicate eff  ectively in order to make their policy decisions accountable, 
transparent and well understood by the public. Th   ere is no doubt that disseminating reliable statistics 
should be considered an integral part of the communication strategy of any policy-maker and so part of 
“evidence-based policy making”.
As Alexandre Lamfalussy, the fi  rst president of the European Monetary Institute, said in 1996, “noth-
ing is more important for monetary policy than good statistics. Statistical information is necessary to 
decide what policy actions to take, to explain them publicly, and to assess their eff  ect aft  er the event”.
Given the independence of the ECB, it is of upmost importance that the public has the possibility 
to hold the ECB accountable for its policy decisions. A high degree of transparency helps to make the 
monetary policy more credible and eff  ective.
Th   e ECB publishes in quasi-real time the information on which its Governing Council has based its 
decisions and its President explains the diagnosis of the situation and actions taken at a press conference. 
A few weeks later, the ECB’s Monthly Bulletin explains the analysis in more detail and provides statistical 
evidence in an annex. Furthermore, the large array of statistics is published expeditiously on the ECB’s 
website in line with a release calendar.
In this regard, disseminating the statistics associated with ECB policy decisions has proved to be an 
eff  ective communication tool, a quasi-policy tool.
However, the pre-requisite for statistics to be an eff  ective channel in communication is that policy-
makers and statisticians are able to understand each other. Communication between statisticians and 
policy-makers should be improved because statistical concepts such as those embedded in statistical 
methodological manuals are sometimes regarded as very technical and are not easily understood by 
politicians and policy-makers. Th   erefore, statisticians must make an eff  ort to understand the European 
22   See <http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/cache/ITY_OFFPUB/KS-32-11-955/EN/KS-32-11-955-EN.PDF>.   
23  See <http://www.ecb.europa.eu/stats/html/pcstats.en.html>.2014
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policy needs, which are usually expressed in “political language” and translate them subsequently into 
“technical language” to ensure precision on what needs to and can be measured.
In this process, the close cooperation between policy-makers and statisticians at national and Euro-
pean level in the design and selection of the most appropriate indicators for policy purposes has proven 
to be a key success factor and has enabled to avoid subsequent “clean up” work.
On the other hand, policy-makers should guarantee the scientifi  c and professional independence of 
statisticians. Experience has demonstrated that the more relevant the statistics are for policy making and 
policy evaluation, the higher the temptation is for politicians to infl  uence the impartiality of the statistics 
when they have failed to achieve the policy goals underlying them.
In turn, with the increased public interest in statistical work, statisticians should refrain from enter-
ing into “politics” by trying to attract the attention of mass media by interpreting politically the develop-
ments they have measured and identifi  ed.
Given the European context, preserving the boundaries of the professional independence of statisti-
cians is a key element for producing high-quality statistics and for building trust among Member States, 
European institutions and the EU citizens which they serve.
CONCLUSIONS
Statistics are increasingly present in all European policy decisions because they provide the evidence for 
analysis, decision-making and transparent communication.
Th   e decisions taken by European policy-makers to overcome the eff  ects of the economic and fi  nancial 
crisis rely heavily on (new) sets of indicators which try to summarise complex developments. Th   is has in-
creased the policy relevance of statistics, which, besides providing the basis for good decision making, now 
can trigger automatic action when certain agreed thresholds are exceeded. Furthermore, a lack of correc-
tive action in response to warnings and recommendations may eventually lead to the imposition of fi  nes.
It is therefore fundamental to ensure that European statistics are of the highest possible standard in 
order to make them sound and undisputable. If statisticians produce statistics impartially and free from 
political or any other external pressure, policy-makers will have at their disposal a powerful tool to as-
sess the situation correctly, implement appropriate and credible measures and explain their decisions to 
the public. Moreover, citizens are entitled to receive objective information on a given situation and to be 
able to monitor the results of policies.
In diffi   cult times, in which unpopular decisions need to be taken, good quality statistics contribute to 
building up mutual trust. During the last two decades, enormous eff  orts have been made in this respect 
by both systems of European statistics, the ESS as well the ESCB, but ensuring the quality of statistics re-
mains a never ending challenge. As the economies and the policy challenges develop further, the statistics 
have to evolve too to stay relevant for the policy makers, in order to allow for the right policy answers. 
Th   e process of “growing together” has to go on.
In this endeavour, adequate resources and close cooperation among statisticians, both academic and 
offi   cial, as well as with policy-makers at national and European level, are key factors for success.
Statistical institutes and central banks have to work closely hand-in-hand to ensure the necessary level 
of quality and with that, the continuous credibility of European statistics.
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